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Mr. Geoffrey Butler
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
RE:

Busch Development v. State Farm and Royal Insurance
Case No. 19859

Dear Mr. Butler:
On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, it is requested
that the following cases be brought to the attention of the
Court, pursuant to the Court's request for additional
authorities at oral argument held in this case on Wednesday,
February 11, 1987. These cases fall into two categories:
(1) Insurance coverage where first notice of claim was received
by the insurance company subsequent to trial against the
insured; and (2) standards for determining whether an insurance
company has been prejudiced as a result of untimely notice
of claim.
In all of the following cases, the insured's liability
had been established through trial against the insured, and
the insurance company did not receive notice of the claim
until after judgment had been entered against the insured.
In all of these cases, the Courts held that whether or not
the insurance company had been prejudiced as a result of
untimely notice was a question of fact to be determined by
the Trial Court, and that prejudice as a matter of law could
not be presumed based solely upon untimely notice of claim:
Halsev v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 68 Or.App.
349,
681 P.2d 168 (reconsideration denied 1984;
burden of proof regarding the issue of prejudice
is on the insurer, and whether or not insured acted
unreasonably is relevant only if insurer can establish
prejudice).
Pulse v. Northwest Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 18
Wash.App. 59, 566 P.2d 577 (rehearing denied 1977;
insurer has affirmative burden of proof regarding
the issue of prejudice resulting from lack of notice).
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Morales v. National Grange Mutual Insurance Co..
176 N.J. Super.
347, 423 A.2d 325 (1980; burden
of proof of prejudice is on the insurer).
Fakouri v. Insurance Company of North America, 378
So.2d 1083 (La.App., 1979; insurer must prove actual
prejudice to deny claim based on lack of notice).
Gerrard Realty Corp. v. American States Insurance
Co., 277 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 1979; untimely notice
of claim creates rebuttable presumption of prejudice
to the insurer, and burden of proof is on the claimant
to prove lack of prejudice).
The following cases set forth standards for determining
the issue of whether an insurance company has been prejudiced,
based on the assumption that notice of the claim to the
insurance company was untimely:
Falcon Steel Company, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty
Co. , 366 A.2d 512 (Del. Super., 1986).
Prejudice
to the insurer resulting from delayed notice must
be determined based upon loss of substance and not
merely loss of opportunity for the insurer to follow
its established procedures. Whether delay has caused
prejudice to the insurer must be based upon evidence
and reasonable inferences and cannot be left to
mere speculation; the insurer bears this burden
of proof. The test is not what the insurer might
have done, but what probable results would have
been achieved if the insurer had a chance to act
upon timely notification.
The insurer must show
that evidence which likely could have been developed
by prompt investigation has not or cannot be developed
by later investigation or that a resolution of the
claim could have been reached if prompt notice had
been given which resolution could not be reached
after the late notice.
The loss of opportunity
to talk to a potential claimant before that party
employs an attorney is not prejudicial.
TravelerTs Insurance Co. v. Feld Car & Truck Leasing
Corp. . 517 F.Supp. 1132 (D.Kan. 1981).
A showing
of material prejudice is required before an insurance
company can avoid its responsibilities and cause
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a forfeiture of the insurance policy.
The burden
of proof on this issue is on the insurance company;
this is the more equitable standard because most
of the terms of the insurance policy are adhesionary.
If an immediate investigation was begun of the events
leading to the claim, then the insurance company's
interests may have been protected.
The issue of
prejudice is one to be decided by the jury.
Thompson v. Grange Insurance Association, 34 Wash.App.
151, 660 P.2d 307 (1983).
The party claiming
prejudice has the affirmative burden of proof on
that issue. Even though the delay in giving notice
is extraordinarily long, the Court is reluctant
to presume
prejudice
without
actual proof of
prejudice.
Even though the statute of limitations
has run, thereby barring any potential subrogation
claim by the insurance company, where there is no
showing that the potential subrogation defendant
has assets with which to satisfy the subrogation
claim, prejudice was not established.
Great American Insurance Co. v. C.G. Tate Construction Co., 46 N.C.App. 427, 265 S.E.2d 467 (1980).
In determining whether prejudice exists, a court
should consider such factors as the availability
of witnesses, the ability to discover information
regarding the location of the accident, any physical
changes in the scene during the delay, the existence
of official reports concerning the occurrence, the
preparation and preservation of demonstrative and
illustrative evidence such as vehicles or photographs,
and the ability of experts to reconstruct the scene.
Morales v. National Grange Mutual Insurance Co.,
supra.
Generally two variables are considered in
resolving whether the insurer has been prejudice.
First,
whether
substantial
rights
have
been
irretrievably
lost.
The insurer must establish
more than the mere fact that it cannot employ its
normal procedures in investigating and evaluating
the claim; it must show that substantial rights
pertaining to a defense against the claim have been
irretrievably destroyed. Second, whether the insurer
had a meritorious defense or could have successfully
defended the claim if notice had been timely.
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Halsey
v. Fireman's
Fund. Insurance
Co., supra.
Whether the insurance company was prejudiced by
late notification is an issue of fact,
The court
should
consider whether
the
insurer
might have'
achieved a better result even if it had been notified
of the c] aim pri or to trial.
Fakouri v. Insurance Company of North America, supra.
Where there is no showing that the insurance company
was prejudiced by the manner in which the suit was
tried, in that the case could not have been settled
for less than the amount of ju.dgm.ent, and that the
result of the case would have been the same if the
insurance company had received notification prior
to trial, the insurer has failed, to establish its
defense of prejudice resulting from, late notice.
Your
assistance
and
cooperation
in
bringing
these
authorities to the attention of the Coi irt is greatly appreciated
Ve r y t ru1y yon rs ,
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